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1  Introduction
In an unprecedented move, a standards body recently
(November 2003) petitioned the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) to re-examine a
patent, which it claims should not have been granted.
One of the complaints the standards body made is
that the patent office was wrong to issue the (‘906)
patent1) because the extension of exclusive right to
the technology in question could hamper the future
development and use of HTML, the main language
used on the web.2) The implication is that by granting
exclusive rights on the particular technology, the
patent office can inadvertently undermine wider inno-
vation on the web. 
The W3C’s complaint is one of several current cases
that illustrate that tension continues to mount
between standards bodies and IPR regimes. It illus-
trates the scope for conflict between these two institu-
tions and suggests that the underlying tension is inti-
mately associated with the innovation of network
technologies. This article reviews how the underlying
tension between IPRs and SDOs has increasingly led
to conflict. It looks to the touchstone of the conflict
(in the late 1980s during the standardization of
GSM), reviews some approaches to deal with con-
flict, and discusses how the conflict has evolved and
what this might mean. The article frames this discus-
sion in terms of the distinct roles that standards devel-
opment organizations and intellectual property rights
play in the “innovation infrastructure” and contends
that this process is bringing what are initially comple-
mentary functions in the innovation process into
increased confrontation.
2  An essential tension in the
innovation process3)
The interrelationship between intellectual property
rights regimes and standards development organiza-
tions is characterized by an inherent tension. This ten-
sion grows out of the fact that these institutions per-
form functions that complement one another in the
innovation process. Conventional analysis of their
respective roles provides an initial appreciation of
how they can be construed as complementary and
can thus indicate how tension might emerge between
them.
2.1  An innovation perspective
Innovation is a complicated and heterogeneous pro-
cess, the dynamics of which will tend to vary from
case to case. In general terms the innovation process
can however be understood to involve the sustainable
generation, distribution and utilization of new eco-
nomically-relevant knowledge which continuously
accumulates and is recombined in the economy.4)
This process boils down to an ongoing interaction
between the generation of technological variety and
its selection. There is a complex set of factors that
induce and promote the creation of diversity and
affect the selection process. It follows that there is
likewise a complex interrelationship that keeps the
virtuous circle of the two in swing. Intellectual prop-
erty rights regimes and institutional standardization
are two central institutions that play complementary
roles in perpetuating such a balance. This section
briefly looks at these roles, indicating the implica-
tions of the roles coming out of balance.
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Patents and other industrial IPRs have the potential to undermine the collective pursuit of a technical
standard that might serve the common interests of the sector or industry. This tension between the
individual and the collective, between the development of technology and its diffusion, is by no means
new; it is an inherent feature of standard development as an institution of innovation. The premise for
this article is that the scope for conflict has increased over time. The increasing prevalence of the
conflict raises a set of challenges for policymakers, patent offices, standards development organiza-
tions, and businesses. The article contributes to increasing awareness in these environments.
1) The patent in question is the “Eolas patent”, number 5,838,906. It is already the object of contention in a case Microsoft fame, since
Microsoft has appealed a patent infringement suit, entitling Eolas to $520 Million. See also Washington Post (Jonathan Krim),
November 13, 2003
2) The standards body in question is World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)—a primary forum for internet standards-development. It is a
standards forum or consortium and not a standards development organization.
3) This section builds on Iversen 2000a; 2000b.
4) E.g. David and Foray (1995).
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2.1.1  IPRs
The economics literature tends to cast IPRs, particu-
larly patents, as “appropriation mechanisms whose
dominant function is to create an incentive for private
R&D where the market does not”.5) The creation of
an incentive to invent is one of at least three different
ways in which patents, in particular, contribute to the
promotion of technological diversity in the economy.
Patents also publish details of the invention to the
economy. In this way it also diffuses economically
useful information to future or parallel innovative
activities, thus fertilizing future inventive effort. A
further function that is more and more important in a
climate where inter-firm collaboration is more inten-
sive, is that patents also help provide the basis for a
desirable level of coordination of collaborative R&D
activity. Patents regimes are therefore essentially a
combination of an incentive-oriented “appropriabil-
ity” mechanism married – in a certain state of trade-
off – to a diffusion oriented disclosure mechanism
(i.e. publishing patents). In other words, “patents are
designed to create a market for knowledge by assign-
ing propriety property rights to innovators which
enable them to overcome the problem of non-exclud-
ability while, at the same time, encouraging the maxi-
mum diffusion of knowledge by making it public.”
(Geroski, 1995: 97)
2.1.2  Standards
In this “market for knowledge”, IPRs are thus most
often identified as a promoter of a diversity of tech-
nological ideas. An instrumental consequence is that
IPRs lay the basis for proprietary technologies. In
contrast, the role standardization, especially in stan-
dards development organizations (SDOs), plays in
innovation6) can be associated with a selection pro-
cess to reduce variety and with the creation of non-
proprietary goods; ideally, they work in the collective
interest of all actors. In general the economics litera-
ture tends to associate the role of formal standardiza-
tion with the idea of the ‘failure’ of markets. Schmidt
& Werle (1998) indicate that the focus tends either to
be on the reduction of transaction-costs, especially
related to information, or associated with network
externalities. Standards are associated with, among
other things, reducing uncertainty by controlling vari-
ety; enhancing competition by clearly defining what
is required to serve a market (information); constitut-
ing markets by defining the relevant aspects of prod-
ucts (Tirole, 1988); facilitating scale-economies for
suppliers, or influencing the distribution of cost and
benefits of building and operating large complex
technical systems (Mansell, 1995: 217).
Standards play a particularly important role as ‘selec-
tion mechanism’ in the case of network technologies,
where the importance of narrowing the diversity of
network technologies in order that the industry can
take advantage of network externalities is high-
lighted.7) In short, network technologies are vulnera-
ble to the generation of ‘too much diversity’. These
technologies rely on connectivity, and their worth
therefore rises in proportion to their user bases. As
a result, the unbounded proliferation of different,
incompatible versions of an emerging radical technol-
ogy may lead to a damaging Tower of Babel situa-
tion. The fight of individual alternatives to establish
dominance in such a situation can be costly both for
manufacturers, service providers and customers. In
the end, a protracted fight for dominance might
undermine the potential market for that emerging
technology altogether, and remove it from the tech-
nology race. Networks will simply not be created in
a sustainable way; the value of the component for
the consumer will not be realised. Failing to amass a
‘critical mass’ of users, the technology risks missing
its fabled window of opportunity. There are many
examples of this situation of the type of Betamax or
more recently of the CT-2/Telepoint system.
2.1.3  Division of labor
In short innovation is dependent on the dynamic
interaction between variety-creation and an ongoing
selection process. IPRs and formal standards develop-
ment organizations play important roles in the inno-
vation infrastructure to keep this evolutionary rela-
tionship working generation after generation of tech-
nological change. Figure 1 illustrates the stylized
division of labor where IPRs, especially patents, are
most closely related as incentive mechanisms to the
continuous generation of technical variety while
formal standards bodies, especially voluntary SDOs,
are most closely related to selection from among the
ripening variety of technological solutions.
In reality, the roles are not this clear cut. The way
IPRs and SDOs are used mixes their roles with regard
to the creation of variety and the promotion of selec-
5) See Arrow, Kenneth (1962). Economic Welfare and the allocation of resources for invention (in The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity: Economic and Social Factors). For a recent empirical and theoretical contribution, see Cohen, Nelson & Walsh. Protecting
their intellectual assets: appropriability conditions and why US manufacturing firms patent (or not). NBER Working PAPER No.
7552. Feb 2000.
6) See Iversen, 2000.
7) See Katz & Shapiro, 1985, Farrell & Salloner, 1985, David, 1987. For an alternate view – ie. that network-externalities are not
important, see Liebowitz & Margolis, 1999.
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tion. On the one hand, the standardization process has
moved further and further in front of the market, such
that standards activities contribute to creating new
solutions not provided for by the market; the seman-
tic web standards are one example. On the other, the
increasing strategic use of IPR to create defensive
bulwarks against competing technologies for example
can serve to mimic a selection mechanism; such
strategies can limit the scope for competing technolo-
gies to emerge and therefore reduce the gene pool
from which new combinations of emerging technolo-
gies can develop and recombine.
Indeed the interaction between variety and selection
– and the roles of IPRs and SDOs in it – are much
messier than the figure suggests. It does however
point to an essential trade-off in the innovation pro-
cess, it indicates the complementary roles of IPRs
and SDOs, and it suggests the essential tension that
underlies that relationship. In this setting, maintaining
balance is important. Too much variety may be bad
since, “variety conveys efficiencies in specialization
and customization that are offset by the failure to
achieve network externalities and other economies of
scale” (Steinmueller, 1995). Likewise, the opposite
may also be the case since, “in reducing diversity,
standardization curtails the potentialities for the for-
mation of new combinations and the regeneration of
variety from which further selection will be possible”
(David, 1995). Therefore, in the ongoing interaction
between the generation of technological variety and
its selection, “effective long-term adaptation requires
that these two processes be kept in balance” (Carlson
& Stankiewicz, 1991).
2.1.4  Emerging conflict
Since the mid-1990s, it has been observed (e.g.
Iversen, 1996) that a set of forces has served to
amplify the tension and has begun to threaten the bal-
ance. The prospect that the role of IPRs should come
into conflict with the complementary role of formal
standardization suggests that the way these institu-
tions are each evolving is translating the inherent
tension into conflict (Iversen, 2000b).
The potential for conflict between intellectual prop-
erty rights and standardization arises when the imple-
mentation of a standard, by its essence, necessitates
the application of proprietary technology. The case of
‘essential intellectual property rights’8) is implicit to
the tension between the two institutions. When a stan-
dardization development organization starts work to
codify a standard specifications for a telecom system
it will be working in an area where private agents
have already researched and perhaps developed pro-
prietary technologies. The risk that may emerge is
that the codification of the standard specs will
infringe the proprietary rights described in the IPRs
of one or more such agents. The IPR will be consid-
ered ‘essential’ if the standard, by its depth and detail,
necessitates the use of the proprietary technical solu-
tions describe in it. Should it do so, the collective
interest in the standard confronts the private interests
of the IPR holder.9)
A court is ultimately needed to establish whether or
not the IPR (patent or software-copyright for exam-
ple) is really ‘essential’. At the same time, a court
case would require considerable time and resources,
and could jeopardize the collective standardization
enterprise. So the difference between an IPR that is
in reality essential and one that is potentially essential
is not that great after all: both cases threaten to tie up
the standardization process. Essential intellectual
property rights in this sense should be further differ-
entiated from ‘Blocking IPRs’ which definitively
block the process.
2.2  The business perspective
Before looking at what situations blocking IPRs pre-
sent for business, this section first reviews the poten-
tial benefits of standardization in today’s world.


































A state of freedom
IPRs and the promotion of diversity
8) For a description of the possible outcomes, see Lea & Shurmer, 1995. See Iversen, 1999 for the way ETSI IPR Policy addressed such
outcomes.
9) See Miselbach & Nicholson (1994) for a description of essential IPRs.
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2.2.1  Business in a standardizing world
Business is increasingly aware of the benefits of stan-
dardization. The standardization processes taking
place in the formal settings of ITU, ETSI and IETF
– as well as in industrial standardizations forums is
taken seriously by businesses. Yet, not all companies
have the resources to follow standardization activi-
ties; to contribute and try to get preferred solutions
accepted is even more time consuming. Patenting is
also expensive and time consuming. As indicated
above, similarities do not end there. Both patents
and standards are ways of codifying technology and,
thereby increasing increased use and increased inno-
vation. This means that any company that has a strat-
egy that encourages competitors to use their technol-
ogy will benefit – in theory. If the market adopts the
technology, increased volumes will lower production
costs. This is the effect of making a technology public.
This is what IBM and others have done with the PC
market. IBM continues to profit from that strategy in
part because they continue to license out technologies
related to PCs. The basic technology for the PC is
free, but there are many improvements for which
IBM holds patents. So they developed an innovative
strategy for licensing which roughly entails that they
forgo suing PC manufacturers for patent infringement
where “infringers” buy IBM hardware like disks and
pointing devices.
Now, the PC standard is not a formal standard pro-
duced by a standardization body. Instead it is (a set
of) de facto standard(s) that have evolved continu-
ously the last twenty years. IBM released the original
AT specifications but then tried to force the Micro-
Channel Architecture (a 16- and 32-bit bus standard)
onto the hardware manufacturers. They objected, and
the PCI standard evolved, which has now been
replaced – but still most PCs have PCI-slots for add-
on hardware. There are many vital parts of the PC-
architecture that IBM lost control over (from proces-
sor and bus to operating system), but still IBM man-
ages to earn money from licensing PC-related tech-
nology. This illustrates how a large industrial actor
can benefit from spreading its own technology rather
than using the exclusionary possibilities of IPR. Nor-
wegian examples are how the Nordic Telecom
Administrations opened their specifications for the
mobile technology NMT. 
2.2.2  Standardization in a business world
The link between a standards process, especially a con-
tinuous one in the software world, and business can be
even closer, as the collective standards efforts take on
the aspect of product in marketing. An increasingly
prevalent tactic is that standards are branded and mar-
keted as brands. This raises new considerations. 
XML is a strong brand. It is however not a registered
trademark, and the effect of this is that a company
does not need a license from a standardization forum
to state that a product is based on XML10). The same
goes for e.g. MP3 – the digital audio format11), which
has even become a consumer brand. 
For MP3 there are registered figure marks, but Thom-
son, who license the patents, do not require a licensee
to use a particular logo, neither do MPEG-LA who
do the licensing for MPEG-2 (used for your DVD-
movies) and MPEG-4. MPEG-LA has a voluntary
option to mark products that they are “licensed by
MPEG LA®” – but that is hardly good brand build-
ing. A CD-player or most CD covers will include the
“Compact Disc” logo that is a part of the licensing
terms from Philips. Philips has full control over
essential CD patents, so they can dictate such mark-
Figure 2  Some registered trademarks for standards and their owners. The Blaupunkt and Grundig MP3
versions are used proprietary. The CD logo is used on all CDs. A similar logo exists for DVDs. The users
in an interest group own the Bluetooth trademark jointly
Blaupunkt Thomson Thomson Grundig Philips Bluetooth SIG
10) XML as an industrial standard is promoted by OASIS http://www.oasis-open.org/. See also http://www.xml.org and
http://www.w3.org/XML/. XML was originally developed at the World Wide Web Consortium – W3C http://www.w3.org
11) MP3 is the nickname for layer 3 of MPEG1 and was developed by Fraunhofer and Thomson, see http://www.iis.fraunhofer.de/amm/.
It is now an ISO standard, and Fraunhofer’s patents are licensed by Thomson, see http://www.mp3licensing.com/ 
See http://www.mpeg.org/MPEG/mp3.html#licensing for papers on MP3 and IPR.
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ing. As the CD-format now is so established nobody
thinks of the branding work and how it competed
with e.g. Sony’s MiniDisc. Nowadays there is not
much to gain for a company in promoting their prod-
ucts as Compact Disc compliant.12)
The Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) has
developed a very successful branding programme:13)
“The Bluetooth logo is a licensed trademark of the
Bluetooth SIG, Inc. Anyone wanting to use the
trademark for commercial purposes must be
licensed to use it. Licensing is simple. It only
requires you to become a Bluetooth SIG member.
You may do this by going to the www.bluetooth.org
website and follow the instructions for becoming
a member. Adopter level membership is free, but
requires that you sign the Bluetooth Trademark
Licensing Agreement, thus allowing you to use the
logo for all purposes.”
This promotes consistent use of the Bluetooth trade-
mark and is a powerful way of promoting the stan-
dard. So any adaptor of that technology gets market-
ing assistance and accesses to a brand. This effect of
standardization is more and more taken into consider-
ation in standardization forums; other examples
include how Apple licensed for free the FireWire
brand for the IEEE 1394 standard and the logo pro-
gramme from USB Implementers Forum for their
competing standard.
During any standardization process the participants
will be asked what IPR they have related to the stan-
dard, and whether they are willing to license their
IPR using “RAND” terms, i.e. Reasonable And Non
Discriminatory terms. Statements about this are usually
published at the website of the standardization body. 
A patent is the only way to get a legal monopoly in
the private sector. When including patented technol-
ogy in a standard, the owners are asked to waive the
rights of refusing their fiercest competitors to use that
technology – and to agree to stick to a price that is equal
for all licensees. This is the trade-off for submitting a
technology to a standard, and the return can be:
• A widespread use of the technology;
• Easy identification of licensees, as they will say
they follow the standard when promoting their
products;
• Help spot infringers, as licensees will tell on others
not paying license fees;
• A patent pool14) that can help to establish a licens-
ing programme.
For a company that will earn money from sales of the
services or goods that are covered by the patents, it
may be of little interest to earn money from a licens-
ing programme. The main income will anyway come
direct from their customers, and setting up a licensing
operation, even through a pool may be a nuisance
taking the focus away from core business. But for an
R&D institution or for a small high-tech company,
this can be a good way of recovering R&D costs. It
takes a long time however to establish a pool, typi-
cally five years. This is not a good economic incen-
tive for most organisations where the return horizon
is less than three years. 
For companies like IBM, Ericsson or Philips, which
have large patent portfolio and culture focusing on
IPR, it is common to use standardization combined
with IPR for business purposes. For smaller compa-
nies, like eZ systems discussed in a case later in this
article, it is difficult to participate in the standardiza-
tion processes, but successful products can be devel-
oped based on standards and IPR used actively in the
business model. Standards are now branded actively,
and Bluetooth ® serves as a good example.
2.2.3  The balancing act
Standardization involves a trade-off between ensuring
rapid deployment of a standard in the market place
and maximizing profit on IPR. Time-to-market or
time-to-money are two of the key decision factors for
a telco when it introduces new services. International
standards may be a catalyst for value creation if the
actors across the value network adopt the standard. In
the case of MPEG-4 (below) it is important that the
chain from content provider to service provider, to
network operator to end-user (terminal equipment)
has adopted the standard. The sooner a standard
reaches market-wide acceptance, the sooner the com-
mercial success for the telco, as the economy of the
12) The DVD logo and format is licensed by DVD FLLC, see http://www.dvdfllc.co.jp/ for licensing terms.
13) https://www.bluetooth.org/bluetooth/landing/brand_tools.php 
14) Patent pools are discussed many places in this article. A good overview is in “Robert P. Merges – The case for patent pools”, 1999 –
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.pdf. Many more links and information can be found at
http://www.cptech.org/cm/patentpool.html.
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telco is largely based on volume of transactions (e.g.
completion of a call or number of bits transferred).
One of the main forces inhibiting rapid deployment
of a standard is the battle between the vendors imple-
menting technology based on the standards, as they
want to maintain their uniqueness and maximise
return on investment on research and development.
This behaviour is very closely linked to the business
models for the technology vendors that are usually
licenses based on software, and per unit based for
hardware. An open question is whether business
models that are more closely linked to the success of
actual services from the telco, would be more benefi-
cial for both the technology vendors and the telcos.
However, one obvious disadvantage for the technol-
ogy vendors would be that “time to money” increases.
2.2.4  Facing up to blocking IPR
However, the interaction between business and stan-
dards increasingly raises the situation of the essential
and blocking IPR. A blocking IPR can be a result of
two main situations for companies. In the first general
set, the IPR holder refuses to license or refuses to on
a basis that is considered fair, reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory (see below). The threat to withhold IPRs
in this situation may be used as a bargaining chip.
A flat refusal would be regarded with extreme suspi-
cion. The existence of essential intellectual property
rights among individual rights-holders outside the
standardization work is much less predictable. Absent
the necessary search processes, such rights may
appear at any time during the life of the standard. The
willingness of the rights-holder to license at agreeable
terms is likewise not a bygone conclusion, especially
if added to already agreed upon royalty-schemes.
The second set of cases involves a plurality of rights-
holders. The relevance of this case – that more than
one right held by more than one rights-holder – is
itself testimony to the fact that intellectual property
rights and the work of standards development organi-
zations have become much more inter-tangled. A
variety of rights-holders complicates the licensing
process which is supposed to be fair both for the
licensee and licensor. What happens when the cumu-
lative royalty costs, while fair to the individual rights-
holder, become too high for a potential licensee? The
short answer is that the standard would die. This
raises the question of different ways to address cases
of conflict, which are becoming more and more com-
mon. Finding solutions to new challenges in the inter-
action however does not happen by itself.
3  Cases of mounting tension and
conflict
By late 2003, a single SDO (ETSI15)) reported that
95 companies had claimed 8,800 IPRs essential or
potentially essential to the organization’s work.16)
Twenty years ago, things were significantly different.
No record would have been available, for one thing.
For another, the assumption would be that there
would be few if any essential IPRs. In a relatively
short period of time, essential patents have gone from
being an exception to being the rule. This section will
review some of the cases of conflict that have emerged
over time indicating that the number of cases of con-
flict has proliferated in number, type, and severity.
3.1  Early cases of conflict
The first cases of conflict began to emerge in the
1980s when US courts heard several cases involving
participants of standardization activities who had not
disclosed their patents during standards work. The
first relevant case appears to have involved a format
for magnetically coding and storing information. This
technology then became integrated into an ANSI’s
Group Coded Recording (GCR) standard, which was
initiated by an existing licensee (IBM) of the patent.
Mutter (2002) shows that in it, the Potter Instrument
Company participated actively in the elaboration of
the ANSI standard without notifying the standards
committee of its patents, in a contravention of ANSI
committee policy. The company then sued another
company who implemented the standard for patent
infringement.
The ruling indicates what can be at stake in such
a case when it concluded that, “Potter … gained a
monopoly on the GCR industry standard without any
obligation to make its use available on reasonable
terms to competitors in the industry” (207 U.S.P.Q.
763: 769 (E.D. Va. 1980) cited in Mutter (2002). The
patent holder was prohibited from enforcing the
patent in question in what then was an unprecedented
judgement. Several years went by when a similar case
again emerged at ANSI involving an ATM card vali-
dation system in Stambler v. Diebold, Inc (1988)17).
Under somewhat similar circumstances, the patent
holder left the standardization committee for what
would become the THRIFT and MINT standards
without disclosing relevant patents; he waited until
the standard was implemented to assert the patents.
Again according to the Mutter report, the court found
that this behaviour was improper and that the undue
delay in asserting the patent suggested to the market
that the patent had been abandoned. The patent holder
15) ETSI (1998). IPRs; Essential, or potentially essential IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards. SR 000 314 v1.3.1.
16) Caveats about dependability: duplicates, the claim of ‘essential’. However on the other side other patents may be left out.
17) See Mutter (2002).
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could not just “assert that his patent covered what
manufacturers believed to be an open and available
standard.”18)
3.2  The GSM Case19)
At about the same time as Stambler v. Diebold, Inc,
a case had begun to materialize in Europe that today
stands as the touchstone for the increasing conflict
between standardization activities and IPR. This case
involves the IPR controversy generated during the
extensive standardization of the now popular GSM
system. The GSM case is different both in quality and
in degree from the earlier US cases. The immediate
areas of contention for example did not actually wind
up in court. It is rather the number and degree of
rights implicated, the diversity of actors involved, the
timing and intensity of the controversy, and its vari-
ous by-products that presage a “new situation” and
the need for new approaches to deal with it.
3.2.1  Background
The GSM system is based on 10,000 pages of techni-
cal specifications, covering all aspects of the mobile
system. As described elsewhere (Iversen, 1996,
2000b), this is a case of a comprehensive, deliber-
ately over-specified and wide set of standards that
entered into a veritable IPR minefield. A variety of
factors including the composition of participating
parties, the variety of their home markets (in techni-
cal and geographical senses), and the rather unique
circumstances for involvement in the project helped
what was bound to involve sensitive navigation
between the collective interests of the standards pro-
cesses and the private ones of individuals into a con-
frontation.
The question of IPRs was a central challenge that
began to emerge at a critical stage in the standard’s
development. Thomas Haug (2002), who led the
work20), reports that the first indications that the
GSM work was “loaded with patents” emerged in
1985. Many areas of the formative standardization
efforts in fact implicated patents although this was
foremost the case in speech coding. This situation
confronted CEPT policy which mandated that speci-
fications should be avoided which involved technolo-
gies that were not available on non-discriminatory
terms without royalties. In the event, efforts were
made with the result that agreements were secured
for two patents in the speech coding technologies:
beyond these, “the IPR issue was going to cause a lot
of difficulties in the work of the new Pan-European
system” (Haug, 2002: p 20).
Time would show that ‘essential patents’ were
claimed at all levels of the GSM system by a number
of different actors. It is reported that by the late
1990s, over 20 companies claimed to hold about 140
patents which they construed as ‘essential’ to the
GSM standard (Bekkers, 2000).21) These are dis-
tributed among several types of technologies (switch-
ing, speech-coding, radio transmission, etc.). In addi-
tion, they accumulated over time. More than 60 % of
these were initially applied for after the GSM system
had essentially taken shape in the late 80s; that is, at a
time when the equipment manufacturers had already
become involved. In this context, the later patents are
less important to the important first stages of adop-
tion of the GSM system.
In the event, work was handed over from CEPT22) in
1988 to the new European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI). The creation of this new Euro-
Box 1  Timeline of mobile communications highlights
1946: First civilian mobile system launched in Missouri
1979: 900 MHZ band reserved by the World Administrative Radio
Conference (WARC of the International Telecommunications Union).
This substantively laid the basis for the development of mobile
communications.
AMPS launched (Bell Labs)
1981: NMT (cooperation between Scandinavian PTTS and some
manufacturers)
1982: First meeting of Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) in Stockholm
1985: TACS (AMP- based)
1986: Validations Systems tested
1987: GSM opted for ‘the broad-avenue’ digital approach
GSM Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
1988: ETSI instituted
IPR conflict commences with refusal of MOU terms
1989: GSM transferred to ETSI
1991: GSM phase I standards
1993: GSM phase II standards
Source: Iversen, 2000b.
18) 8. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715 (Fed. Cir. 1989: cited in Mutter (2002)). Contrast with the current Rambus case below.
19) This case is drawn on work in Iversen (2000), as well as Blind et al (2002). 
20) In the Special Group set up by the Committee for Coordiantion of Harmonization CCH of CEPT. 
21) This figure is based on the analysis by Bekkers et al. (2002) of first-filings of the patents reported to ETSI as being “essential”.
22) The European PTT body: Conférence européenne des administrations des postes et télécommunications.
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pean standards organization coincided with the move
to deregulate the European telecoms markets. One
implication was that the standardization process grew
in the transition to include a set of vendors from in-
side and outside Europe.23) Another consequence of
the transition was that the IPR question was moved to
the purview of the administrators of the crucial GSM
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1987.
3.2.2  Memorandum of Understanding:
coordination and conflict
The MoU was an agreement between the Telecom
Operators primarily to coordinate the launch of the
system in 1991. It was an agreement in which the
TOs (at the time, the PTT administrations) of 15
CEPT countries entered in 1987, directly before the
handover to ETSI. This agreement supplanted an
earlier four party agreement from 1985 and put into
place the logistics of a coordinated launch from the
TO’s point of view. In it the signatories committed
themselves to a common organizational line on the
deployment of the GSM system. It was imperative
to the success of the GSM system that the launch be
synchronized, that equipment-type be proven compat-
ible and that there was a rolling commitment to its
future development of system. It also laid the basis
for the first commercial contacts to take place
between customers (the Telecom Operators, TOs)
and vendors (equipment suppliers) for the provision
of equipment based on the GSM specifications. In
several prominent cases, there were traditional alle-
giances between the national PTTs and equipment
manufacturers (Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Alcatel).
What provoked the confrontation were the terms gov-
erning bidders’ freedom to exercise their IPRs that
were employed unilaterally by the 17 participating
PNOs. What was contentious for the IPR-holders was
that the contracts specified that equipment suppliers
were obligated to undertake to license any “essential”
patents royalty-free within the CEPT area and to
license to all-comers outside the CEPT area at “fair,
reasonable and on-discriminatory terms.” This clause
was appealing since it could potentially defuse any
risk that IPRs might pose to the collective launch of
this “over specified system”.
The controversial IPR clause has an interesting her-
itage. Appearances would suggest that it grew out of
traditional relationships now being eroded between
PPTs and national vendors, where contracts typically
left the clearance of rights (“have-made rights” provi-
sions) to the vendor (Iversen, 2000b). This may be
one factor. But the real reason according to Stephen
Temple, who led the MoU, had to do with the legacy
of attempts during the mid-80s to lay the basis for an
open mobile standard based on a Franco-German
technology. In the event, the French and German
governments together requested that this clause be
included. The reason was that the R&D activities that
had been funded by the Franco-German program in
a bid to create an open standard on their own, were
covered by such a clause (Temple, 2002:45).24) Roy-
alty free licensing provisions are not uncommon in
publicly funded R&D. When Franco-German efforts
were more fully integrated within the GSM work in
the later 1980s, the governments were concerned that
their vendors would be forced to license royalty free
while other vendors could set their own terms.
3.2.3  Dissent and conflict
The terms pertaining to the equipment suppliers’
exercise of IPRs that were codified in these prelimi-
nary contracts proved contentious for some of the
manufacturers. The individual reactions of different
suppliers must however be seen in terms of a set of
factors that include: how many patents a manufac-
turer held that could be construed as “essential” to
the GSM standard; which technical area they were in;
and, relatedly, the orientation of their IPR strategies.
The other factor was whether or not they had been
involved in R&D funded by the Franco-German
work. In this setting, the US-based Motorola Corp
held a wild-card position. It became the most vocal
opponent to the GSM-MoU signatories’ terms. Sev-
eral features of this company can be linked to the
vocal position it took, including the fact that its
home-market was outside the EU, the structure of its
markets was different (technically and geographi-
cally) from the other actors, and that it needed to
strengthen its position in Europe while limiting the
potential for competition with its other markets (for
example the US).
The number of essential patents claimed by Motorola
was three times as high as its rival (in the range of
24–30, according to interviews.) This fact alone
effectively raised Motorola’s ‘ante’ and implied that
it would want a larger part of the pot. Further, the
technical area in which these patents were concen-
trated was important. The reason for this has to do
with the different types of pay-off structures con-
23) The ETSI was established in line with the recommendations from the Green paper on the development of the common market for
telecommunications services and equipment (COM (87) 290), which signalled the deregulation of the telecoms market in Europe.
The ETSI included multinationals including companies with their headquarters outside Europe, for example Motorola.
24) Stephen Temple led the administration of the MoU.
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nected to different sorts of technologies. Because of
the orientation of its technology, Motorola was dis-
satisfied with market prospects and was therefore
unwilling to forfeit the additional returns afforded by
licensing royalties. This raises a third characteristic,
namely about Motorola’s aggressive in-house IPR
policy coupled with its lack of market shares in
Europe.
It became increasingly apparent that the emerging
GSM system was extraordinarily exposed to the risk
that either “cumulative” licensing costs would price
GSM out of the market or that IPRs would not be
licensed. The system was indeed perceived to be
extremely vulnerable. Against this background, the
North American company decided to utilize its
patents to gain access to market shares in the dawning
European market. Therefore when Motorola refused
the terms of the MoU and demanded separate under-
takings for individual contracts, a serious controversy
was ignited with MoU signatories. Motorola’s strat-
egy of a selected number of cross-license agreements
helped reduce the number of equipment suppliers
effectively to five: Siemens, Alcatel, Nokia, Ericsson
and Motorola.
The conflict mounted with accusations and recrimina-
tions. Concerns peaked when consensus around the
IPR clause in the MoU began to break down, and pro-
curement contracts were issued without it. Some tele-
com operators are reported to have launched some-
thing of a campaign at this point, claiming that
Motorola was refusing to license its IPR: their con-
cern was that Motorola’s strategy would make GSM
too expensive (which during the recession of 1991–2,
when this occurred, was a general concern). The well
publicized conflict began to involve talk of legal
actions and Motorola, who said its reputation suffered
as a result of the accusation, at one point considered a
liable case. In the end, prices of network equipment
and handsets did not undermine the adoption strategy
behind the standardization of the GSM system. But
controversy went on to breed more controversy in
ETSI.
3.2.4  SDOs begin to readdress the IPR conflict
The adoption of the GSM standards represents some-
thing of a watershed in the relationship between for-
mal standardization and intellectual property rights.
This case presaged a proliferation of conflict since,
involving different national and technological set-
tings, and different types of rights (including copy-
rights) under different circumstances. It also set the
stage for a somewhat different case in the related area
of Terrestrial Trunked Radio standards25), an inter-
esting conflict involving software copyrights and
irregularities in the SDO’s procedures related to IPRs.
The legacy of the GSM conflict that is perhaps most
important is that it directly led to the reappraisal of
rules and guidelines not only in ETSI but in other
SDOS, for addressing the increasing probability for
conflict. ETSI’s controversial search for procedures
that departed from normal practice of other interna-
tional SDOs tested the question of what sort of new
provisions a modern SDO needed to address the IPR
question in the emerging environment was hotly con-
tested. It became a lightning-rod for conflict and led
ETSI into a protracted controversy both at the institu-
tional, the legal and the political levels. ETSI’s search
for new procedures involved a total of five identifi-
able phases, and generated an unprecedented level
and degree of controversy (see Iversen, 1999
for details), ultimately leading to a lawsuit before
the European Commission. ETSI’s search for an
approach to IPRs that differed from normal practice
subsequently sparked a revision in the ways other
international SDOs address IPR policies. In parallel,
the ANSI revamped its IPR policy in light of its expe-
riences with the GCR, and the THRIFT and MINT
standards. Although ETSI’s attempts fell away from
their initial trajectory and gravitated back towards
normal practice, the minimal procedures of SDOs
like ITU-T were subsequently updated in the wake of
the ETSI work. The search entailed a difficult balance
between more or less detailed procedures designed to
address the increasingly complicated problem facing
ICT standardization.
4  The emerging need to readdress
the question
In addition to TETRA, a set of cases followed in the
wake of GSM and ETSI’s controversial search for
new procedures is currently forcing the industry to
re-examine the balance between IPRs and standard-
ization. Standards bodies from the traditional ITU to
the less traditional (and more idealistic) W3C have
since introduced new guidelines to varying levels of
controversy; IETF’s attempts have consistently met
with controversy. The overall tendency is that con-
flicts and concerns have grown as a series of new
types of conflicts have evolved, and the question of
what to do with ‘essential IPRs’ is a day-to-day con-
cern. At the same time, there is an emerging need for
new ways to deal with the increasingly common con-
flict, such as patent-pooling arrangements accompa-
nied by some form for regulatory clearance. Other
25) See Bekkers (2000), Blind et al (2002).
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initiatives may involve reforming the way patents are
granted, for instance as indicated in the W3C case
involving Eolas.
4.1  Current signals from the Courts
A current case in the US has reopened the question of
how individual IPR holders is to be balanced against
the interests of collective standardization activities.
Taking place on the heels of a landmark case which
related non-dislosure to anticompetitive practices26),
the Rambus case is now drawing into question this
obligation in certain respects.
4.1.1  Rambus v. Infineon and FTC v. Rambus, Inc.,
FTC (No. 9302)
The balance between the rights of right-holders and
the collective interests of the standards is however in
the process of being reopened by a current case. The
original case, Rambus v. Infineon Technologies AG,
pertains to patents on synchronous DRAM27) held by
Rambus, a company that manages IPRs. Four compa-
nies including Infineon were charged with infringing
these patents when they produced what was intended
to be an open, royalty-free standard for SDRAM
elaborated by the JEDEC Solid State Technology
Association28).
Rambus, the patent-holder, participated in the JEDEC
committee work from 1992 until 1996 when it left
prematurely. Rambus’ departure reportedly coincided
with the Consent Decree of Dell Computer Corp; and
allegations are (Mutter, 2002) that a patent applica-
tion that was pending while Rambus was on the com-
mittee was subsequently altered through a series of
divisionals or continuations.
In October 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) however found in favour of the
patent-holder (Rambus) in a remarkable 2-1 split
decision which overturned a lower court that had
found it guilty of fraud for failure to disclose
patents29) that it later tried to enforce. The two judge
majority held that Rambus was not obligated under
JEDEC’s patent policy manual30) to disclose pending
patent applications.
Rambus is today in a position to assert patent rights
pertaining to the relevant JEDEC standards, that
would entitle it to an estimated31) billion dollars in
royalties from memory manufacturers producing in
compliance with those standards. In addition, its
patent position is expected to knock-on to several
other markets. This has laid the basis for a Complaint
lodged by the Federal Trade Commission against
Rambus on antitrust charges, alleging the “deception
of Standard-Setting Organization and violation of
Federal Law.” The assertion is that,
Had Rambus properly complied with JEDEC’s
rules and abstained from any misleading conduct,
the FTC contends that this likely would have
impacted the content of the organization’s SDRAM
standards, the terms on which Rambus could
license any pertinent patent rights, or both. That is,
according to the FTC, the royalties that Rambus
has been able to charge SDRAM manufacturers
would not likely have been sustainable without the
pattern of misleading and deceptive conduct out-
lined in the complaint. (FTC, 2002)32)
The complaint concurs with the lower court ruling,
and is under consideration before the FTC Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ). One key question is
whether patent applications, which have not been
published in the US until recently, should have to be
disclosed. The interpretation of the ALJ is expected
to have a set of important implications. In general, the
line taken in the CAFC ruling seems to take balance
between IPR holders and SDOs in a significantly dif-
ferent direction to that established in the Consent
Decree re Dell. It will have significant implications
for how JEDEC and indeed all US SDOs approach
IPR disclosure rules. A clarification is awaited with
considerable expectation by JEDEC, who is currently
reconsidering its IPR policy in light of the CAFC rul-
ing, and by the industry.
26) Federal Trade Commission v. DELL Computer Corporation – 1996.
27) According to Nuts & Volts Magazine: http://www.nutsvolts.com/Encyclopedia.htm: “(Synchronous DRAM) A type of dynamic RAM
memory chip that has been widely used starting in the latter part of the 1990s. SDRAMs are based on standard dynamic RAM chips,
but have sophisticated features that make them considerably faster”
28) Once known as the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council.
29) According to The Inquirer (http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=9224), the original patent application was filed in 1990 before Ram-
bus became involved with JEDEC. This application subsequently led to numerous divisionals and continuations, such that the case
currently involves 31 unique U.S. patents. 
30) No 21i. 1993.
31) See FTC Complaint. http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/rambus.htm
32) FTC Issues Complaint Against Rambus, Inc. Deception of Standard-Setting Organization Violated Federal Law
http://anon.user.anonymizer.com/http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/rambus.htm
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4.2  Patenting pooling: MPEG 4
The pooling of patents is an increasingly utilized
method for standards to deal with the situation of
multiple patents in the hands of various actors. It has
been used recently for DVD technologies, but per-
haps most notably in terms of different MPEG stan-
dards, one pool that has been hailed as a success is
the pool established for the MPEG-233) standard in
1997. It is managed by the Denver-based company
MPEG LA, and was set up to provide an easy, rea-
sonable, fair and non-discriminatory way for users to
access the necessary patent rights to develop digital
video. The licensees receive at one set price access
to all rights needed in order to meet the MPEG-2
standard.
4.2.1  Background
The MPEG2 patent pool proved to be a tremendous
success for the licensors, and the standard achieved
widespread acceptance in the market place. The criti-
cal success factors in this licensing scheme was:
• A royalty scheme that was perceived to be fair and
reasonable in the market place;
• A professional licensing administrator with the
ability to deal with a large number of licensees and
closing contracts;
• A critical mass of licensors with credibility in the
market place, and the financial ability to enforce
the rights if necessary.
With this success in mind, the MPEG-4 Visual patent
pool was set up in 2000 to serve the commercial
interests of the essential patent holders in the stan-
dard. In 2002, patent holders and the licensing admin-
istrator agreed on licensing terms for the pool. The
patent holders are approximately the same as those
participating in the MPEG-2 patent pool, with some
new entrants including Telenor. A total of 22 compa-
nies hold essential patents in the pool. At present 103
companies have signed up for licenses. Equipment
manufacturers and software companies dominates
this list of companies, even though the license is also
targeted at telecommunication service providers. The
reason for this is mainly that there is currently a very
limited number of operators that facilitate streaming
MPEG-4 over their networks.
For the telecommunication operators, this is a new set
of circumstances. Traditionally telecommunication
operators bought equipment from vendors through
contracts that had patent indemnity clauses. These
clauses protected the operator patent from getting
entangled in litigation with third parties (see have-
made rights). With the Internet the distinction
between platforms and services has become more
blurred. In the case of the MPEG-4 Visual license,
the telecommunication operator now provides a ser-
vice that is streaming MPEG-4 video, becomes a
licensee. This is a completely new business model,
where the patent holders in the MPEG-4 Visual
patent pool are actually claiming a royalty for every
MPEG-4 video streamed by the telecommunication
operator.
One main difference between MPEG-2 and the com-
petitive environment surrounding MPEG-4, is the
availability of competing proprietary technologies.
Major competing technologies include Microsoft
Windows Media Player, Apple Quicktime and Real
Networks. One implication of this arrangement is
that a licensor in the MPEG-4 Visual patent pool like
Microsoft has had access to all information regarding
the formation of the patent pool and the license terms.
In launching a version of its proprietary Windows
Media 9 series platform in 2003, Microsoft created
its own licensing terms explicitly to compete with the
pools, claiming “Microsoft’s new licensing agree-
ments give greater flexibility to developers and cost
significantly less than MPEG-4, MPEG-2 and other
mainstream technologies” (Gartner Research, 2003).
This is the beginning of the battle for rich media con-
tent distribution on the Internet. In contrast to the
more software driven vendors like Microsoft, the
equipment vendors are more in favour of MPEG-4
and want to promote the open standard. At the
moment, competing solutions coexist, and there are
no signs of who is winning the war.
4.3  Combining copyleft in licensing
arrangements: the example
The collective efforts of software developers has
taken on qualities of a standardization process. Such
efforts have faced the challenge of combining propri-
etary contributions into collective frameworks in
novel ways. The case of eZ systems illustrates one
strategy that combines copyright with copyleft.
eZ systems34) develops an open source framework
for Content Management Systems. eZ produces soft-
ware and publishes all their code. It is based on a
voluntary community that contributes to testing,
improvements and bug fixing – and they earn their
33) MPEG-2 is the technology that underlies the effective transmission, storage and display of digital video, which feeds over media
including satellite and personal computers.
34) see http://www.ez.no
76 Telektronikk 2.2004
money from selling services and from their licensing
model, where you have two choices. You can either
buy a professional license by which you have the sole
rights to whatever software you build based on their
framework, or you can have a free license based on
the GNU General Public License.35) The GPL licens-
ing terms mean no licensing fees for the user on the
one hand but commits him to a set of dos and don’ts
on the other. The user commits for example to dis-
close source code on his contributions publicly and
freely and to assure the code to be free open source
software (no rebranding nor bundling with propri-
etary systems). By committing to these terms, the
user avoids paying licensing fees while being able to
use the software, to distribute modifications, as well
as to sell services based on the software.
These limitations are typical for “copyleft” licensing.
Note that eZ systems insists that all copies must have
a proper copyright notice and that any added code
must be public and cannot be licensed. If you buy a
“professional licence” even if you have the rights to
the additional source code you have written, if an-
other programmer wishes to make changes to that
she will also need a professional license.
The code eZ systems publishes is based on interna-
tional standards including XML and PHP program-
ming libraries. So in order to actually use the frame-
work, a developer will depend on standardized tech-
nology. The nice touch in eZ’s business model is that
they will benefit independently of what licensing
option a programmer chooses. If she goes for the free
copyleft license, she will share her results with eZ. If
she pays and goes for the professional license, she
will pay eZ and if she shares the results, the new pro-
grammers will also pay. eZ benefits from the stan-
dards that are an integrated part of their framework;
they could have developed it all by themselves – but
the rapid adaptation of their framework is of course
due to the confidence that standards promotes. Many
standards are good brands, and XML is one that eZ
benefits from.
The arrangement also benefits from the work that the
standardization bodies do to ensure that the technol-
ogy does not infringe the IPR of others. So, the
XML-standardization bodies like W3C have a patent
policy36) that ensures that XML can be used without
paying royalties or taking a license37). This is also
connected to the discussions on patenting and soft-
ware in general, an area which is still open in Europe
after the EU parliament did not manage to pass the
directive on software patents.38) In brief, eZ uses
copyright and copyleft and a licensing scheme to pro-
mote their technology. It is based on standards, and
benefits from both their branding and the patent poli-
cies of the standardization bodies.
4.4  The Eolas patent and the W3C
Complaint
The balancing act between IPR holders and standard-
ization activities not only involves the procedures of
standards development organizations in dealing with
essential IPR; it also involves the quality of the cor-
pus of intellectual property currently building up in
the ICT area. The World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) complaint mentioned in the introduction
implies that the way patents are granted unnecessarily
exacerbates the potential for conflict in promoting
new standards ultimately facilitating innovation. The
complaint contributes to a gathering critique of patent
quality in the US.39) One instrumental element is the
recommendations of the Federal Trade Commission
for ways to reform the patent system in the US.
The complaint draws into question in particular two
aspects of patent granting procedures at the United
States Patent and Trademark Office; patent novelty
and patent scope. The “Eolas” patent40) was origi-
nally granted to the University of California for a
technology that provides web browsers to access
interactive features on a web page. The patent was
subsequently licensed to Eolas Technologies Inc.
Eolas is not a vendor, but rather an IPR management
company that lives by creating and, more to the point,
enforcing IPRs. It recently won a patent infringement
suit against Microsoft on the same ‘906 patent,
rewarding Eolas $520 Million. Companies like Eolas
play a non-traditional role in the market since they
do not vie for market share. They live by ‘leveraging’
35) http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html The notion “copyleft” is used in favour of Copyright. The legal framework and IPR however
are that of Copyright. Read more about GNU and the Free Software Foundation at http://www.gnu.org/. 
36) http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/ 
37) There are hundreds of patent applications on XML-based technology. Microsoft was awarded a US patent in February 2004. More
details and references are at http://news.com.com/2100-7345_3-5158432.html 
38) Håkon Wium Lie, chief technology officer of Opera Software, said to ECT News Network 
August 26, 2003 indicated that software patents are not helpful to software development. 
39) See Updegrove, Andrew (2003). Do IT Patents work? And: Patents: Too Easy to get, too hard to challenge. (httm//www.consortiu-
minfo.org/bulletins/nov03.php. 
40) Patent number 5,838,906, covering technology that allows Web browsers to access interactive features on a Web page.
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IPR. Accordingly their market considerations are
much different from traditional IPR holders, who cre-
ate and maintain IPR portfolios as a means to support
their manufacturing activities. This means, among
other things, that their behaviour will not necessarily
comply with the market logic that brings together the
different interests into the standardization process to
begin with. In this setting the IPR portfolios of IPR
management companies have the potential to become
loose cannons in the standards setting environment.
This type of player poises a challenge to standards
development organizations and consortia. It is inter-
esting to note that the W3C activities had not yet led
to litigation by the Eolas patent, only to the Microsoft
case which has caused something of an IPR outcry.
The fact that W3C and Microsoft are active advocates
against the Eolas patents indicates how widespread
the outcry has been.
Two issues are raised in the W3C which have deeper
implications for the way the USPTO grants patents.
The first is that the USPTO granted a patent that does
not fulfil the novelty criterion required by the patent
system. The second is more fundamental and in-
volves the changing role of the patent regime: the
standards body complained that by granting exclusive
rights on the technology in question, the USPTO can
inadvertently help undermine the future development
of HTML, the main language used on the web.
5  Conclusion
The scope for conflict between IPRs and standardiza-
tion continues to increase, generating considerable
uncertainty. The increasing prevalence of the conflict
has brought into question how standardization efforts
can better deal with the potential conflict, and it even
has actualized calls to improve patent quality. The
potential for conflict raises a set of challenges for pol-
icymakers, patent offices, standards development
organizations, and business.
The article contributes to increasing awareness in
these environments. It briefly surveyed the genesis of
this conflict by first looking at the conceptual basis
for conflict in terms of the innovation process. The
article went on to review cases that illustrate the
potential for imbalance between IPR and standardiza-
tion and that indicate ways to deal with this increas-
ingly likely situation. The cases survey different con-
flicts in different settings, including those related to
the non-disclosure of granted patents (e.g. the GCR
standard), US patent applications (Rambus), as well
as copyright questions (DVSI in TETRA). Emphasis
was however placed on the GSM case. This case, and
ETSI’s subsequent search for a new IPR policy,
stands as a lightning rod for the increasingly delicate
balancing act between IPR and standardization. This
European case further raised issues related to multiple
patents spread among diverse interests, including
concerns of cumulative royalties. In the US, the
recent cases involving the Federal Trade Commission
have more recently served to reopen the question of
the balance especially in light of factors that are
unique to the US environment.
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